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Abstract
In recent years, Germany and other European countries face the strongest immigration flow in
their history. Experts unanimously agree that one of the core factors of a successful social inte-
gration is the labor market participation of the new arrivals. This paper investigates the impact
of low-skilled immigration on a unionized economy with labor market frictions. It especially
examines how immigration affects the technology choice of firms and, thereby, the technological
alignment of the host country. The labor market is characterized by heterogeneity on both sides
of the market. Within this framework, it can be shown that low-skilled immigration encourages
firms to invest more in a basic technology, which leads to a deterioration of the technology level
in the whole economy. It can be further shown that policies, which improve the access of already
existing low-skilled immigrants to the labor market counteract the effect that is triggered by an
increase in low-skilled immigration.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the number of immigrants has severely increased in Germany and other
European countries. Especially countries, such as Iraq and Syria, where human rights
are violated and war is omnipresent, face a huge outflux of refugees. For example, in
Germany the number of asylum applications increased about 267% from 2014 to 2016
(Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2017). Facing this enormous increase in the number of im-
migrants, there is an ongoing public and political debate within and across European
countries about how this situation changes the European Union and its member states,
and how it should be dealt with. Politicians and scientists agree that the key factor for a
successful integration of these refugees is their participation in the labor market. However,
such a substantial shock in labor supply may strongly change the respective countries’
labor markets.
This paper analyzes the effects of low-skilled immigration on the host country in a
theoretical model. In particular, the model investigates how the technological alignment
of the economy is altered. It is assumed that immigration is low skilled, since it is known
that most refugees from the aforementioned countries are indeed low skilled (Bru¨cker
et al., 2015a, 2015b). Even if there are, up to now, no completely reliable numbers
concerning the qualification of immigrants, it can be concluded that about two out of three
refugees have visited at maximum secondary school. Further, about two-thirds have not
completed vocational training (compared to 14% of German citizens with no immigration
background). Even if immigrants are high skilled, it remains open if their skills are
comparable to those of high-skilled natives in Europe. The reason is that the educational
system is very different between countries, such as Germany and countries from the middle
east. Hanushek & Woessmann (2015) compare the educational performance of pupils
across 81 countries. They find that the average performance of 15 year old pupils from
Syria is 140 PISA-points worse than that of German pupils of the same age. This amounts
in about the knowledge pupils acquire in four to five school years.
To analyze the effects of immigration, a search and matching model a` la Mortensen
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& Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) is applied. Thus, unemployment is present due
to the existence of frictions in the labor market. In comparison to the standard matching
model, there is more than one type of worker. Since it is distinguished between high and
low skills, natives and immigrants, and it is allowed for low-skilled immigration, the model
incorporates three groups of workers. The distribution of skills across workers is assumed
to be exogenous. Firms post either high- or low-tech vacancies, however, they cannot
distinguish ex ante whether they meet a native or an immigrant. While the skill distribu-
tion of workers is exogenously given, the skill requirements of firms adjust endogenously.
Thus, the paper is able to address the question how low-skilled immigration affects the
firms’ technology choice and, hence, the technological orientation of the host country as
a whole. Furthermore, it analyzes if policies that improve the access of immigrants to the
labor market counteract or even strengthen the effects that are induced by an increase in
immigration. To do so, the model builds on Albrecht & Vroman (2002), who investigate
the technology choice of firms under worker heterogeneity in the absence of immigration.
In most European countries wages are determined by collective bargaining agreements
between firms and labor unions, with the average coverage rate of collective bargaining
being slightly above 60% (Eurofound, 2015). Therefore, labor unions are an important
institution in the wage negotiations in the European Union. Low-skilled immigrants offer
firms the option to use a cheaper production possibility. As they are not covered by
collective bargaining, due to their marginal position in the labor force, the lack of a social
network etc., low-skilled immigration has an effect on the power of labor unions and may
deteriorate their position in the labor market.
The main result of the model is that firms react to the increase in low-skilled immi-
gration by using the basic technology more intensively. Thus, the composition of jobs in
the economy changes. Many firms shift their production to the less-advanced technology
and produce simple, less-advanced goods. It is further shown that low-skilled immigra-
tion is beneficial for low-skilled natives, while high-skilled workers are hurt in terms of
wages, but gain in terms of employment. At first sight, this may seem implausible, since
low-skilled immigrants are competing with low-skilled natives for jobs. However, firms
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react to the increase in low-skilled immigration by producing with the less-advanced tech-
nology more intensively. Hence, the pervasive fear of low-skilled workers to get displaced
by immigrants is unfounded at least in this type of model. As a second result, it can be
shown that policies that target at a reduction in immigrants’ costs of searching for a job,
to improve immigrants’ access to the labor market, work in the opposite direction. Firms
have an incentive to produce with the more advanced technology. Thus, the host country
is shaped by a high-tech production industry. Hence, it may be a favorable economic
policy to improve the access of immigrants to the labor market. However, such policies
hurt low-skilled natives both in terms of wages and employment, while high-skilled natives
gain in terms of wages, but lose in terms of employment. A drawback of such policies is
that the wage inequality among native skill groups increases.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief discussion of related
literature. Section 3 describes the outline of the model and its components in more detail,
before the equilibrium is derived in Section 4. Section 5 provides analytical results, i.e.
analyzes the changes in the technology choices of firms, the wage-setting and employment
structure triggered by an increase in low-skilled immigration and by a decrease in search
costs of immigrants. Section 6 calibrates the model to German data and measures quan-
titatively the effects of these two scenarios. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the results and
concludes.
2 Related Literature
The model, that will be developed in the following, combines several strands of literature.
Most of the theoretical literature in labor economics studies the effects of immigration
within a standard neoclassical growth model (for an overview see Ben-Gad, 2004, 2008;
Moy & Yip, 2006; Palivos & Yip, 2010). However, a basic assumption of this type of
model is that there is perfect competition in the labor market and, thus, there is no
involuntary unemployment. Up to now, there exist only very few studies that analyze
the impact of immigration in a search and matching model a` la Mortensen & Pissarides
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(1994) and Pissarides (2000). Ortega (2000), Liu (2010), Chassamboulli & Palivos (2013,
2014) and Battisti et al. (2014) provide first contributions to analyze the labor market
effects of immigration. Their focus is on the effect of skill specific immigration on the
wage level, employment and its structure in the host country. However, it is not taken
into account that firms may adjust their production technology. The implementation of
such an endogenous technology choice is necessary, since skill-specific immigration leads
to a change in the relative supply of labor. As a consequence, the incentives of firms to
invest in specific technologies may change. This results in an endogenous, skill-biased
technical change. Further, it is not considered that there is a skill mismatch in the labor
market and that most of the wage rates are determined collectively in most European
countries.
Even if the behavior of labor unions has already been widely discussed (for an overview
see Booth, 1995; Boeri et al., 2001; Addison & Schnabel, 2003), little attention was paid on
modeling unionized labor markets in the framework of search and matching until recent
years. Delacroix (2006) gives a first contribution of collective wage bargaining in the
matching framework. He introduces a multisectorial model with a varying degree of union
coverage and monopolistic competition in the goods market and analyzes how unions
react due to changes in the unemployment insurance. Based on this framework, Ebell &
Haefke (2006) investigate the effect of product market deregulation on the formation of
labor unions by endogenizing the choice of the bargaining institution. Krusell & Rudanko
(2012) study the intertemporal effect of unions’ commitment to future wages, while Bauer
& Lingens (2013) analyze the efficiency in search models with large firms and collectively
bargained wages. In another recent contribution, Baudy & Cords (2016) examine the
general equilibrium effects of deregulating temporary agency employment in a unionized,
frictional labor market.
Theoretical work on endogenous technology choices is rather limited. Acemoglu (1999)
studies the effects of skill-biased technical change. In his model, the job-filling and job-
finding rate are exogenously given, which yields to the conclusion that all jobs are identical
in the economy if the productivity difference between low- and high-skilled workers is
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small and/or if the proportion of high-skilled workers in the economy is low enough.
Mortensen & Pissarides (1999) also use a model with an exogenous skill distribution of
workers and heterogeneity on both sides of the market to show that the effects of a skill-
biased technical change depend on the different systems of unemployment insurance and
employment protection in Europe and the US. However, they assume that workers are
able to direct their search, which leads to perfect matching of workers and jobs with the
appropriate skill requirement.1 This paper uses and extends the framework developed by
Albrecht & Vroman (2002), who investigate how a change in the productivity of a high-
skilled job changes the technology choices of firms in a closed economy. In their model,
there are two type of workers, low- and high-skilled, that are searching for a job. Jobs
differ in their skill requirement. Jobs that use the basic technology can either be performed
by low- or high-skilled workers, while a job that uses the more advanced technology can
only be occupied by a high-skilled worker.2 Davidson et al. (2008) extend this framework
to two countries that differ in the technologies firms produce with. In comparison to this
paper, they look at the effects of offshoring and distinguish between short- and long-run
effects of offshoring. While low- and high-skilled workers are hurt in the short run, the
long-run effects of offshoring high-tech jobs in a specific industry improves the position of
low-skilled workers in the same industry. Dolado et al. (2009) use the model of Albrecht
& Vroman (2002) and enrich it by on-the-job search. Baudy (2017) goes beyond Albrecht
& Vroman (2002) and introduces temporary agency employment by assuming that the
output a regular worker produces is higher than the output a temporary worker produces
using a less advanced technology. He shows that a deregulation of temporary agency
employment affects the technological orientation of the economy through a more intensive
use of the less advanced technology.
1Another contribution is provided by McKenna (1996). In comparison to the other papers, he endog-
enizes the educational decision of workers in a two-sector matching model.
2For example, Gautier (2002) justifies this labor market sorting by using the example of a hamburger-
flipping job, which can be performed by everyone, while only very few skilled workers can be occupied at
NASA as an engineer.
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Liu et al. (2017) are the first that study immigration in a search and matching model
that takes the labor market sorting of Albrecht & Vroman (2002) into account. How-
ever, they focus on the imperfect transferability of foreign human capital and neglect the
endogenous technology choice of firms. This paper is the first theoretical work that com-
bines labor unions, immigration, educational mismatch among natives and endogenous,
skill specific technology choices all together in a search and matching framework. Thus,
the paper is able to reveal how immigration affects the technological orientation of the
host country and, in addition, how the position of labor unions in the economy is altered.
3 Outline of the Model
3.1 Basic Assumptions
All workers are assumed to live forever, to be risk neutral and to discount the future at
a constant rate r > 0. Further, the model is in continuous time. As in the standard
matching literature, workers can be in either of two states: employed or unemployed.
Workers differ in their country of origin, with i = {N, I}, where N stands for native and
I for immigrant. The measure of natives is normalized to 1. Immigrants are low skilled,
implying that IL = I.
3 Furthermore, natives have different skill levels, with j = {L,H},
where L denotes low-skilled individuals and H denotes high-skilled individuals. The skills
are distributed exogenously on a two-point distribution: fraction p is low-skilled, while
the remaining fraction 1− p is high-skilled.
Considering the jobs that firms offer, they can either be filled or vacant. There are two
type of jobs, which differ in their skill requirement. If any job is filled, it gets destroyed
with the exogenous job destruction rate δ.4 Before a firm enters the market and posts a
3The share of low-skilled immigrants is obtained by dividing their raw number by the native labor
force.
4Assuming the job destruction rate to be equal across jobs does not change the qualitative results
and, further, simplifies the analytical derivations. Albrecht & Vroman (2002), Davidson et al. (2008) and
Dolado et al. (2009) apply the same assumption.
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vacancy, it has to make a decision concerning its technology choice. The firm‘s production
technology is described as follows: each firm that decides to adopt the basic technology
produces yL units of output if a job is filled, independent of the type of worker the job is
filled with.5 Thus, low- and high-skilled workers are perfect substitutes for low-tech firms.
Firms that use the advanced technology can only produce with high-skilled workers. If
a job is filled, high-skilled workers produce yH units of output, with yH > yL. Adopting
the labor market sorting of Albrecht & Vroman (2002), there are two types of equilibria:
ex-post segmentation (EPS) and cross-skill matching (CSM). In EPS, low-skilled workers
work in low-tech jobs and high-skilled workers only work in high-tech jobs, since these
workers refuse to be occupied in a low-tech job. On the other hand, in CSM, high-skilled
workers sort themselves also into low-tech jobs. The type of segmentation that emerges
depends mainly on the labor market expectations of high-skilled workers and the wage
they could earn in a low-tech job. If the wage paid for them in a low-tech job is quite low
and they expect to find a high-tech job relatively fast, they will sort themselves only in
high-tech jobs. Thus, the resulting equilibrium is an EPS. On the other hand, if the wage
that could be earned in a low-tech job is high enough and they do not expect to find a
high-tech job very fast, the resulting equilibrium is an CSM. Further, the probability that
a CSM exists is higher, the smaller the gap between the productivity in a high-tech and
low-tech job, and the smaller the share of high-skilled natives. In this paper, the focus
is on a CSM, meaning that high-skilled workers take any job that is offered to them.6
Thus, high-skilled workers prefer to be employed in a low-tech job rather than staying
unemployed. There are mainly two reasons: first, in a richer model with more than two
skill groups, overqualification is a more prominent issue. Second, using data from the
EU-LFS for high-skilled German natives that are aged 15-64, it can be shown that 9.8 %
are overqualified.
5It is also possible to assume that high-skilled workers produce µyL units of output. However, Gautier
(2002) points out that there is no reason to assume µ to be unequal than unity. Further, Bla´zquez &
Jansen (2008) and Dolado et al. (2009) also assume µ to be equal to unity.
6It will be shown later that the conditions for a CSM are fulfilled.
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Unemployed workers and vacancies meet each other randomly, so that the matching
function can formally be described by
M = M(v, u). (1)
As in Albrecht & Vroman (2002) and Dolado et al. (2009), for example, search is undi-
rected, meaning that vacancies can not direct their search to a specific type of worker.
Thus, there is a single labor market featuring low- and high-skilled workers and low-tech
and high-tech firms. The matching function exhibits constant returns to scale, is increas-
ing in both arguments, at least twice differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions. M
denotes the instantaneous flow of hires. The number of vacancies posted are denoted by v,
while the number of job-searchers equals the unemployment rate u. Further, the fraction
of vacancies that require a low-skill level is given by φ, while γ denotes the fraction of
unemployed workers that are low skilled.7 The arrival rate of any worker per vacancy
is M(v, u)/v ≡ m(θ), while the arrival rate of any vacancy per unemployed worker is
M(v, u)/u ≡ θm(θ). The arrival rate for firms decreases in θ, while the latter one in-
creases in θ. Variable θ ≡ v/u reflects the overall labor market tightness. As not all
combinations of firms and workers fulfill their mutual requirements, the arrival rates can
be further specified. For instance, the effective arrival rate of vacancies for unemployed
low-skilled workers is φθm(θ). Further, the effective arrival rate of workers for a high-tech
vacancy is (1− γ)m(θ).
3.2 Firms
Firms are small and offer only one job. Before entering the market, they ex-ante decide
which type of technology to use in their production. Once a low-tech job is filled, the
7This type of modelling follows Albrecht & Vroman (2002).
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firm’s expected profit is
rΠFNL = yL − wNL + δ(ΠVL − ΠFNL) (2)
rΠFIL = yL − wIL + δ(ΠVL − ΠFIL) (3)
rΠFOH = yL − wOH + δ(ΠVL − ΠFOH). (4)
Low-tech vacancies can either be filled with a low-skilled native (NL), with an immigrant
(IL) or with a high-skilled worker (OH). The expected profits of a low-tech job that
is filled by a low-skilled worker (native or immigrant, respectively), are given in eq. (2)
and (3). The worker produces yL units of output, which is the same for low-skilled natives
and low-skilled immigrants, while the firm has to pay a wage rate wNL or wIL, respec-
tively.8 Further, the last term on the right-hand-side (RHS) denotes the loss the firm
experiences if the job is destroyed, weighted by its probability of occurrence δ. Equa-
tion (4) represents the case where a low-tech vacancy is filled with a high-skilled worker.
Even if the high-skilled worker is overqualified for this type of job, the output produced
is the same as for a low-skilled worker, yL. However, the firm pays a different wage wOH ,
which represents the wage a high-skilled, overqualified worker obtains. Again, the last
term on the RHS denotes the loss that occurs for the firm if the job is hit by a shock and
gets destroyed. The present value of a filled high-tech job is given by
rΠFH = yH − wH + δ(ΠVH − ΠFH). (5)
Since high-tech jobs can only be performed by high-skilled individuals, the output pro-
duced is yH and the wage the worker receives is wH . Again, the last term denotes the loss
if the position gets vacant.9
The firm’s expected profit of posting a low-tech vacancy is
rΠVL = −cL +m(θ)
[
γ
[
ε(ΠFIL − ΠVL ) + (1− ε)(ΠFNL − ΠVL )
]
+ (1− γ)(ΠFOH − ΠVL )
]
, (6)
8Even if immigrants and low-skilled natives produce the same output, their wages are different. Sec-
tion 4.1 shows that the reason is the difference in the costs of searching for a job.
9Since high-skilled individuals are necessarily natives by assumption, the index N is omitted.
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where cL denotes the costs of a low-tech vacancy and ε is the fraction of low-skilled
unemployed that are immigrants. Considering the present value for a low-tech vacant
job, it is known that low-tech jobs can be occupied by low-skilled natives, low-skilled
immigrants or high-skilled workers. Thus, the gain a firm obtains if a job gets filled is
a weighted sum of the potential gains multiplied by the effective arrival rates and, thus,
depends on the type of worker the vacancy is filled with. In case that a low-tech vacancy
gets filled with an immigrant, the firm gains ΠFIL − ΠVL , while the effective arrival rate
is the product of the overall vacancy arrival rate m(θ) and the probability to meet an
immigrant γε. If the vacancy gets filled with a low-skilled native, the effective arrival rate
is m(θ)γ(1− ε) and the related gain of the firm is ΠFNL −ΠVL . Lastly, if the firm meets a
high-skilled worker, the vacancy is filled with rate m(θ)(1− γ), while the related gain of
the firm is given by ΠFOH − ΠVL .
The firm’s expected profit of posting a high-tech vacancy is
rΠVH = −cH +m(θ)(1− γ)(ΠFH − ΠVH), (7)
with cH denoting the costs of a high-tech vacancy. The last term on the RHS denotes
the gain ΠFH − ΠVH a firm with high skill requirements obtains if a vacant job gets filled.
The gain is only weighted by the effective arrival rate of workers for a high-tech vacancy
m(θ)(1−γ). The reason is that only high-skilled workers can perform a job with high-skill
requirements.
3.3 Workers
The behavior of workers can be stated similar to the firms’ value functions. The expected
value of employment for low-skilled workers is given by
rΨENL = wNL + δ(Ψ
U
NL −ΨENL) (8)
rΨEIL = wIL + δ(Ψ
U
IL −ΨEIL). (9)
The wage rates wNL and wIL, respectively, denote the instantaneous wage income in a
low-tech job. The second term on the RHS reflects the loss from becoming unemployed,
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weighted by its probability of occurrence δ.
The expected value of employment for high-skilled workers is given by
rΨEOH = wOH + δ(Ψ
U
H −ΨEOH) (10)
rΨEH = wH + δ(Ψ
U
H −ΨEH). (11)
Per instantaneous time interval, a high-skilled worker that is employed in a low-tech
firm receives wage rate wOH . A high-skilled worker that is employed in a high-tech firm
obtains wage rate wH per instantaneous time interval. Again, the second term on the RHS
reflects the loss from becoming unemployed, weighted by its probability of occurrence δ,
respectively.
Finally, the present value functions of being unemployed are
rΨUNL = zL + θm(θ)φ(Ψ
E
NL −ΨUNL) (12)
rΨUIL = zL − hI + θm(θ)φ(ΨEIL −ΨUIL) (13)
rΨUH = zH + θm(θ)
[
(1− φ)(ΨEH −ΨUH) + φ(ΨEOH −ΨUH)
]
, (14)
for low-skilled natives, immigrants and high-skilled natives, respectively. While being
unemployed workers receive a flow income zj, which includes the opportunity costs of
employment such as unemployment benefits, leisure and the payoff from home produc-
tion. Further, the search costs of immigrants are denoted by hI . It is more difficult for
immigrants to find a job, compared to natives, due to existing language barriers, the lack
or non-existence of a social network, non-recognition of foreign professional qualifications,
social stigma against immigrants and so forth. As natives do not face these problems,
there are no search costs for native job seekers (the same assumption is also applied in
Ortega, 2000; Battisti et al., 2014; Chassamboulli & Palivos, 2014; Liu et al., 2017). The
last term on the RHS describes the expected gain from possible changes in the labor
market state. For low-skilled workers of either origin the gain is weighted by the effec-
tive arrival rate of low-tech vacancies θm(θ)φ. Considering eq. (14), the potential gain of
changing the labor market state is a weighted sum, since high-skilled workers can either be
hired by a low-tech, or a high-tech firm. The weights are depicted by the effective arrival
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rate of vacancies for low-skilled workers θm(θ)φ, and high-skilled workers θm(θ)(1 − φ),
respectively.
3.4 Labor Unions
It is assumed that most of native workers are members of a labor union. This is in line
with the observed situation in the European Union. In Western Germany, for example,
56 % of the employees work in firms that are covered by collective wage bargaining, see
(Bru¨cker et al., 2012). While most natives are organized in labor unions, immigrants are
not covered by collective bargaining. The reason is that immigrants do have a marginal
position in the labor force and are badly organized, for example, due to existing language
barriers and the lack of a social network. Thus, immigrants bargain individually with
the firm. Furthermore, high-skilled workers that are occupied in a job with low-skill
requirements also have to bargain individually. A reason is that the union is threatened
by those types of workers, since they are perfect substitutes for its clients, and, therefore,
does not represent them.
Since there are one-worker firms, industry wide unions determine the wage rate for
native workers, that are properly matched according to their skill level, by maximizing
the rent of its members. It is further assumed that each skill type is represented by a
separate labor union. The rent of a union member equals the difference between the
expected value of being employed and the outside option, the value of being unemployed.
Hence, the rent of a high-skilled union member is ΨEH−ΨUH , while the rent of a low-skilled
union member is ΨENL −ΨUNL. Multiplying the rent of a union member with the number
of workers employed in the industry, the objective functions of the unions representing
high- and low-skilled natives, respectively, are given by
UH = [1− p− (1− γ)u](1− σ)[ΨEH −ΨUH ] (15)
UNL = [p− γu(1− ε)][ΨENL −ΨUNL], (16)
with σ being the fraction of high-skilled workers that are overqualified, i.e. the fraction
of high-skilled workers that are employed in low-tech jobs.
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3.5 Employer Associations
Firms that offer only one job are rather weak when they negotiate with labor unions that
are representing several workers. Hence, it makes sense that firms also organize themselves
in employer associations to increase their power in the wage negotiations.10 In Western
Germany, about 30 percent of firms engage in industry-wide multi-firm agreements. In
addition, more than 40 percent of those firms, that are not part of the industry-wide
multi-firm agreements, comply with the negotiated wage level (Ellguth & Kohaut, 2014).
Firms organize themselves in employer associations to determine the wage rates for
each skill group separately. Low-tech firms that fill their job with an immigrant or a
high-skilled worker are not part of the employer association but bargain over the wage
rate with the worker individually. The objective functions of the employer associations
are similar to that of labor unions, since they maximize the rent of the firm. In addition,
as the employer associations bargain for all firms in the industry, the objective functions
are given by
ΩH = [1− p− (1− γ)u](1− σ)[ΠFH − ΠVH ] (17)
ΩNL = [p− γu(1− ε)][ΠFNL − ΠVL ]. (18)
Note, that the number of workers that are represented by the labor unions equal the
number of firms that are represented by the employer associations. This necessarily has
to be the case since there are one worker firms, implying that the number of firms equals
the number of workers.
10The employer association density is in almost all European countries much higher than the labor
union density, see Eurofound (2015, Table A1).
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4 Solution of the Model
4.1 Wage Determination
Following Masui (2013), the wages for low-skilled natives are determined via bargaining
between a labor union and an employer association. The collective bargaining problem is
formally described by maximization of the Nash product
max
wNL
{
UNL − U¯NL
}β
·
{
ΩNL − Ω¯NL
}1−β
, (19)
where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining power of the labor union. Further, U¯NL and
Ω¯NL are the thread points of the labor union and the employer association, respectively, i.e.
the utility of both bargaining parties in case that negotiations are not successful. However,
the thread points can be ignored in the following since the utility of both parties in case
of unsuccessful negotiations equals zero. Inserting the objective functions (16) and (18)
yields
max
wNL
{[
p− γu(1− ε)][ΨENL −ΨUNL]
}β
·
{
[p− γu(1− ε)][ΠFNL − ΠVL ]
}1−β
. (20)
Maximizing the Nash product gives
wNL = zL + (yL − zL) · ΓL(θ), (21)
with ΓL(θ) = β
r+δ+θm(θ)φ
r+δ+θm(θ)βφ
. Thus, the wage for low-skilled natives is set as a mark-up
over the income enjoyed while being unemployed. The mark-up ΓL(θ) gives the effective
bargaining power of the labor union that represents low-skilled natives, see Cahuc et al.
(2014).
The wage rate for high-skilled workers is also determined via bargaining between a
labor union and an employer association. The wage is given by
wH = zH + (yH − zH) · ΓH(θ)− (1− β)θm(θ)βφ(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
, (22)
with ΓH(θ) = β
r+δ+θm(θ)
r+δ+θm(θ)β
denoting the effective bargaining power of the labor union that
represents high-skilled natives. In comparison to the wage rate for low-skilled natives,
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the effective bargaining power does not depend on the fraction of vacancies that require a
particular skill type as high-skilled workers are able to work in both type of jobs. Further,
the wage rate is lowered by the last term on the RHS due to the possibility of mismatch.
As discussed in Section 3.4, the wage rate for immigrants is determined by individual
bargaining. Thus, the bargaining problem is formally described by maximization of the
Nash product
max
wIL
{
ΨEIL −ΨUIL
}β
·
{
ΠFIL − ΠVL
}1−β
. (23)
Maximization yields
wIL = zL − hI + [yL − (zL − hI)] · ΓL(θ). (24)
Again, the wage for low-skilled immigrants is set as a mark-up over net unemployment
income zL−hI . As low-skilled natives have a better outside option than immigrants, due
to immigrants’ positive search costs, low-tech firms have to pay low-skilled natives higher
wages. Thus, low-tech firms prefer to hire immigrants.
The wage rate for high-skilled workers that work in low-tech firms is also determined
by individual bargaining. Finally, the wage turns out to be
wOH = zH + (yL − zH) · ΓH(θ) + (1− β)θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
. (25)
The wage is set as a mark-up over the income a high-skilled worker enjoys while being
unemployed. It should be further noted wOH > wNL as high-skilled workers have a better
outside option than low-skilled natives. Thus, low-tech firms prefer to hire low-skilled
workers rather than high-skilled workers. Appendix A.1 provides detailed calculations
about the derivation of the wage rates.
4.2 Labor Demand and Equilibrium
Firms that use the basic technology and the more advanced technology enter the market
and open their vacancies as long as the expected profit of posting a vacancy is positive.
Free market entry drives the expected profit of a vacancy down to zero, i.e.
ΠVH = Π
V
L = 0. (26)
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Further, the present value functions of a filled job, eqs. (2) to (5), are used and combined
with the equilibrium wage levels wNL, wIL, wOH , and wH . Thus, the labor demand for
high-skill employment is
cH(r + δ)
m(θ)
= (1− β)(1− γ)(yH − zH)(r + δ) + φθm(θ)β(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
, (27)
while the labor demand for low-skill employment is given by
cL(r + δ)
m(θ)
=
γ(r + δ)(1− β)
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
[
ε[yL − (zL − hI)] + (1− ε)(yL − zL)
]
+ (1− β) (1− γ)(r + δ)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
[
(yL − zH)− θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL)
]
.
(28)
Appendix A.2 gives detailed calculations, of how the two labor demand conditions can be
derived.
In equilibrium, the flows in and out of unemployment have to be equal, i.e. u˙ = 0.
Thus, the steady-state flow for low-skilled immigrants is given by
φθm(θ)γεu = δ(I − γuε). (29)
Immigrants meet low-tech vacancies at rate φθm(θ) per instantaneous time interval. Mul-
tiplying this rate with the rate of unemployed immigrants γεu represents the instantaneous
inflow of immigrants into jobs that demand low skills. At the same time, employment of
immigrants I − γuε is destroyed at rate δ. The equilibrium in- and outflow of low-skilled
natives can be summarized as
φθm(θ)γ(1− ε)u = δ[p− γu(1− ε)]. (30)
Unemployed low-skilled natives γ(1 − ε)u find employment at a low-tech firm with rate
φθm(θ). At the same time, employment of low-skilled natives p− γu(1− ε) is destroyed
with rate δ.
Similar to low-skilled workers, the flow into and out of unemployment for high-skilled
workers at a low-tech firm is given by
φθm(θ)(1− γ)u = δ[1− p− (1− γ)u)]σ. (31)
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Unemployed, high-skilled natives (1 − γ)u find employment at a low-tech firm with rate
φθm(θ). At the same time, employment of high-skilled natives that are employed at a
low-tech firm [1−p−(1−γ)u)]σ is destroyed with rate δ. The equilibrium in- and outflow
of high-skilled natives at a high-tech firm can be summarized as
(1− φ)θm(θ)(1− γ)u = δ[1− p− (1− γ)u)](1− σ). (32)
Unemployed, high-skilled natives (1− γ)u find employment at a high-tech firm with rate
(1 − φ)θm(θ). At the same time, employment of high-skilled natives that are employed
at a high-tech firm [1− p− (1− γ)u)](1− σ) is destroyed with rate δ.
The flow eqs. (29) - (32) can be used to solve for the two endogenous variables u and
φ, which yields11
u =
δ(1− p)
(1− γ)[δ + θm(θ)] (33)
φ =
(p+ I)(1− γ)(θm(θ) + δ)− γ(1− p)δ
θm(θ)γ(1− p) . (34)
It can easily be shown that the ceteris paribus changes of φ are12
∂φ
∂θ
> 0 and
∂φ
∂γ
< 0.
In order to derive the unemployment rates for each group of workers, it is taken into
account that uIL ≡ γεu, uNL ≡ γ(1 − ε)u and uH ≡ (1 − γ)u. Solving the respective
worker flows, the unemployment rates are given by
uIL = δ
I
δ + φθm(θ)
, uNL = δ
p
δ + φθm(θ)
and uH = δ
1− p
δ + θm(θ)
. (35)
Using the unemployment rates for low-skilled natives and immigrants, it can be easily
verified that ε ≡ uIL
uIL+uNL
reduces to ε = I
p+I
.
11Appendix A.3 shows that the fraction of high-skilled workers that are employed in low-tech jobs (σ)
and the fraction of vacancies that require low-skill levels (φ) coincide.
12 ∂φ
∂θ > 0 for γ >
p+I
1+I . This is fulfilled in CSM, as low-skilled workers compete with high-skilled workers
for low-tech jobs. Hence, the job finding rate of high-skilled workers is greater than the one of low-skilled
workers.
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The interest of this paper is on an equilibrium where all types of workers are employed
and cross-skill matching is present, i.e. high-skilled natives work in both type of jobs. In
order that such an equilibrium exist the following conditions have to hold: yL > zL, which
automatically implies that yL > zL− hI . Further, it has to hold that yh > zH and for the
existence of CSM
(yL − zH)(r + δ) > θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL). (36)
Appendix A.4 provides detailed explanations.
Finally, the four endogenous variables u, θ, γ and φ can be determined using the labor
demand conditions, eqs. (27) and (28), and the expressions for the unemployment rate
and the fraction of vacancies that require a low-skill level, eqs. (33) and (34).
5 General Equilibrium Analysis
5.1 The Effects of Low-skilled Immigration
The model presented above is rather sophisticated and incorporates different mechanisms
through which native workers are affected by an influx of immigration. In order to derive
some analytical results, before the model will be calibrated, a few assumptions are made.
To analyze the effects of an inflow of immigration, modeled by an increase in I, it is taken
into account that the costs of a vacancy are identical across jobs (cH = cL). It is further
assumed that the costs of searching for a job for natives and low-skilled immigrants
are identical, i.e. hI = 0. This implies that the wage rates of low-skilled natives and
immigrants are identical, meaning that there are no differences between those two types
of workers. Considering job creation of low-skilled jobs, eq. (28), it becomes obvious that
the fraction of unemployed low-skilled workers that are immigrants (ε) drops out. Thus,
immigration does not directly affect natives through the job creation channel anymore,
since the expected profit of a low-tech job does not depend on the composition of low-
skilled workers.
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Proposition 1 Assuming that the costs of a vacancy are identical across jobs (cH = cL),
and that the costs of searching for a job are the same for all low-skilled workers (hN = hI),
it can be shown that an influx of low-skilled immigrants I
(i) Promotes the behavior of firms to invest in the basic technology φ;
(ii) Increases the wage rate wNL, and decreases the unemployment rate uNL of low-skilled
natives;
(iii) Decreases the wage rates wH and wOH , and the unemployment rate uH of high-skilled
workers.
Formal proofs are provided in Appendix A.5.
The mechanisms behind the result in (i) are the following. An increase in immigration
raises the relative supply of the low-skilled production factor. Thus, the effective arrival
rate of workers increases, which in turn raises the expected profit out of a low-tech job.
Hence, firms decide ex-ante to invest more in the basic technology.
The findings in (ii) follow from the result in (i). On the one hand, the increase in the
fraction of low-tech vacancies increases the effective arrival rate for low-skilled natives,
since the entry of low-skill firms also raises labor market tightness. On the other hand,
there is a countervailing effect since low-skilled natives face a higher competition due to
the new arrivals. As the first effect dominates the latter one, more low-skilled natives exit
the unemployment pool. A smaller unemployment rate raises the scope of bargaining of
the labor union that represents low-skilled natives. Thus, their wage rate increases.
The intuition for (iii) is as follows. Due to the increase in the fraction of low-tech
vacancies, the value of unemployment for high-skilled workers decreases. The reason is
that the gain for high-skilled workers is larger if they are employed in a high-tech firm,
compared to a low-tech firm, see eq. (14). On the other hand, the availability of more low-
tech vacancies increases the overall job offer arrival rate. As the former effect dominates,
the corresponding union and the overqualified workers reduce their wage claims. This
leads to a concomitant decrease in high-skilled workers’ unemployment rate.
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5.2 The Effects of a Change in Search Costs of Immigrants
In order to improve the integration of immigrants in the society, an easier access to the
labor market serves as a precondition. Therefore, it is often an aim of politicians to reduce
the costs of searching for a job of immigrants, e.g. through language courses, a more
improved advice in a job center and so on. Further, the longer immigrants live in the host
country, the better they learn the language and the more they assimilate into the society.
Hence, both the specific targeted policies of politicians and the willingness of immigrants
to become part of the society reduce the barriers for integration and participation in the
labor market, i.e. immigrants’ search costs hI decline.
Proposition 2 Assuming that the costs of a vacancy are identical across jobs (cH = cL),
a decrease in the search costs of immigrants hI
(i) Reduces the behavior of firms to invest in the basic technology φ;
(ii) Decreases the wage rate wNL, and increases the unemployment rate uNL of low-
skilled natives;
(iii) Increases the wage rates wH and wOH , and the unemployment rate uH of high-skilled
workers.
Formal proofs are provided in Appendix A.6.
The mechanisms behind the result in (i) are described below. The difference in search
costs among low-skilled natives and immigrants ensures that the expected profit of a low-
tech job depends on the composition of low-skilled workers. A decrease in search costs
of immigrants leads to an increase in the flow income of unemployment for immigrants
zL − hI . This increase in turn decreases the expected profit of a low-tech firm. The
reason is that the higher outside option of low-skilled immigrants translates into a smaller
surplus the firm obtains from matching with an immigrant, as immigrants claim higher
wages. Since the expected profit of a low-tech job declines, less firms will decide to use
the basic technology and, thus, φ declines.
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The findings in (ii) follow from (i). The decline in the fraction of low-tech vacancies
directly decreases the effective arrival rate for low-skilled natives. Thus, less low-skilled
natives exit the unemployment pool. A higher unemployment rate reduces the scope of
bargaining of the union that represents low-skilled natives. Thus, the unions’ wage claims
decline, which leads to a lower wage rate of low-skilled natives.
The result in (iii) can be explained in the following way. The decrease in the fraction
of low-tech vacancies translates into a higher value of unemployment for high-skilled
natives. Therefore, the union, that represents high-skilled natives, and the workers that
are employed in a low-tech firm increase their wage claims, since it is less painful for
high-skilled natives to be unemployed. The rise in their wage rates also increases their
unemployment rate, as the firms’ wage costs for high-skilled workers are higher.
6 Quantitative Results
This Section calibrates the model to German data, to show how immigration quantita-
tively affects the technological alignment of the economy and the labor market outcomes
of different types of workers. Further, the calibration is used to assess how immigration
affects the position of labor unions in the economy, and how it changes the total steady-
state surplus of the economy. For the welfare analysis it is assumed that all firms are
owned by natives who obtain all the profits. Thus, the overall welfare of natives is
W =
[
1− p− (1− γ)u](1− σ)yH + [p− γu(1− ε) + I − γuε+ [1− p− (1− γ)u]σ]yL
+ (1− γ)uzH + γu(1− ε)zL − vφcL − v(1− φ)cH − (I − γuε)wIL.
(37)
In spirit of Chassamboulli & Palivos (2013, 2014), an alternative measure of net income
to natives that does not include the income enjoyed by unemployed natives is provided
W1 = W − (1− γ)uzH − γu(1− ε)zL. (38)
The calibration uses the following Cobb-Douglas matching function
M = ξ · uαv1−α, (39)
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where ξ denotes the efficiency of the matching process and α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the match-
ing elasticity. The model is fully characterized by 14 parameters. Table 1 lists eight
parameters that are taken from available empirical literature. First, the elasticity of the
Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Source
α Matching elasticity 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
β Bargaining power 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
ξ Matching efficiency parameter 1 Normalized
yL Production in a low-tech job 1 Normalized
r Quarterly real interest rate 0.012 Chassamboulli & Palivos (2014)
δ Quarterly job destruction rate 0.0318 Hobijn & S¸ahin (2009)
p Share of low-skilled natives 0.74 Battisti et al. (2014)
I Share of low-skilled immigrants 0.1215 Battisti et al. (2014)
matching function α is set to 0.5, which is in the range of estimates reported in Petrongolo
& Pissarides (2001). Second, following most of the literature, including Petrongolo & Pis-
sarides (2001), the bargaining power β is set to 0.5, so that the Hosios condition (α = β) is
fulfilled (Hosios, 1990). Next, the matching efficiency parameter ξ and the productivity in
a low-tech job yL are normalized to unity. Following Hobijn & S¸ahin (2009), the quarterly
job destruction rate δ for Germany is calculated to be 0.0318, while the quarterly real
interest rate r is estimated to be 0.012 (Chassamboulli & Palivos, 2014). Finally, Battisti
et al. (2014) estimate the share of low-skilled natives p to be 0.74, while the normalized
number of low-skilled immigrants I can then be calculated to be 0.1215.
The remaining six parameters of the model are chosen such that the model reflects
seven calibration targets obtained from German data, see Table 2. Table 3 shows the six
parameters that are obtained by exactly reproducing the number of moments with the
model for Germany.13
13In both simulation exercises that are conducted below, the conditions for CSM are fulfilled.
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Table 2: Matched Targets
Target Source Value
Return to skill for native workers EU-SILC 1.45
Native-immigrant wage premium EU-SILC 1.10
Replacement ratios, both skill groups Battisti et al. (2014) 0.44
Vacancy to unemployment ratio EU-LFS, Eurostat 0.35
Fraction of vacancies that require low skills IAB Job Vacancy Survey 0.81
Fraction of unemployed that are low skilled EU-LFS 0.56
Notes: All targets are constructed for Germany. All values that are obtained by the EU-LFS and EU-
SILC databases refer to working age population, aged 15-64 or 18-64 (depending on the availability
of the data). Further, they are averaged over the period 2005-2015. The vacancy data from the
IAB Job Vacancy Survey ranges between years 2010-2015. The skill groups are calculated using
educational attainments of the ISCED-11 classification system. Individuals are low skilled up to
secondary school certificate, i.e. up to level 4 of the ISCED scale. Those individuals between levels
5 and 8 of the ISCED scale are high skilled.
Table 3: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
cH Costs of a high-tech vacancy 2.88
cL Costs of a low-tech vacancy 1.30
yH Production in a high-tech job 1.67
hI Search costs of low-skilled, unemployed immigrants 0.61
zL Flow income of low-skilled, unemployed workers 0.40
zH Flow income of high-skilled, unemployed workers 0.59
Notes: Calibrated from moments of the data for Germany.
6.1 Increase in Low-skilled Immigration
This Section analyzes the effects of a low-skilled immigration influx by increasing the share
of immigrants in the labor force by one percentage point, i.e. an increase from 12.15% to
13.15% of the labor force. Table 4 provides the results for two different versions of the
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model.
Table 4: The Effects of an Increase in Immigration (Changes in Percentage Points)
(1) (2)
Variable hI = hN hI > hN
cH = cL cH > cL
Overall
θ 0.00 0.96
γ 0.09 -0.02
φ 0.74 1.34
u 0.07 -0.06
Low-skilled Natives
wNL 0.05 0.08
uNL -0.07 -0.08
Low-skilled Immigrants
wIL 0.05 0.16
uIL 0.14 0.03
High-skilled Natives
wH -0.17 -0.37
wOH -0.17 -0.37
uH -0.00 -0.01
Unions
ΩH -1.47 -2.68
ΩL -0.56 -1.20
Welfare
W -0.01 -0.10
W1 0.02 -0.06
Column (1) shows the results for the simplified version that was analyzed qualitatively
in Section 5.1. In addition to the results that have been shown analytically, the qualitative
analysis contains results about the utility level of the labor union, which declines due to
low-skilled immigration. This might be puzzling at first sight, especially for the union that
represents low-skilled natives, since low-skilled workers gain in terms of both, employment
and wages. However, these increases are overcompensated by an increase in the value of
being unemployed, which in total leads to a decrease in the utility function of the labor
union, see eq. (16). Finally, it is worth noting that the effect on overall income to natives
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is not clear since the change in the two welfare measures have different signs.
Column (2) shows the effects for the full version of the model, with hI > hN and
cH > cL. In comparison to the simplified version, immigration also has a direct effect
via job creation, see eq. (28), since it is cheaper for firms to hire immigrants due to
their higher search costs. Hence, an increase in immigration leads to an increase in the
expected profit of a low-tech firm, which results in an enhanced vacancy posting of low-
tech jobs. In both specifications it is a priori unclear, if the demand or the supply effect
is dominant. However, it is shown analytically that the demand effect is the dominant
one in the basic model. In the full model, the demand effect is even strengthened by the
effect that is active through job creation.14 Thus, the unemployment rate of low-skilled
natives decreases, while the unions’ scope of bargaining increases.
Considering high-skilled natives, the availability of more low-tech vacancies increases
their overall job offer arrival rate. On the other hand, there is a negative effect on the
outside option of high-skilled workers since their expected labor income decreases due to
the increase in the fraction of low-tech jobs. As the latter effect is dominant, their value
of unemployment decreases. Thus, the union reduces their wage claims for high-skilled
workers, while the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers decreases.
Further, Table 4 reveals that almost all effects coincide for both specifications of the
model, whereas the only qualitative difference is that in Column (2) overall unemployment
does not increase, but slightly decreases and that the fraction of unemployed that are
low skilled (γ) decreases. The driving force for the decrease in overall unemployment
is the much smaller increase in the unemployment rate of low-skilled immigrants. The
argument is the same as above: due to enhanced low-tech vacancy posting, the demand
effect is strengthened. Even if it can not fully serve the inflow of immigrants in the pool
of unemployed, the increase in immigrants’ unemployment rate is much smaller than in
14Dolado et al. (2009) show that there are opposing effects in the case of skill-upgrading and that it is
a priori unclear how the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers reacts. They use a similar argument
and explain that it is more likely that the demand effect outweighs the supply effect in case of on-the-job
search.
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specification (1).
Finally, it is worth noting that these effects are exactly the opposite one expects in a
model with perfect competition and no search frictions. In the present model, low-skilled
natives gain due to higher search costs (implying lower net unemployment benefits) of
low-skilled immigrants, while high-skilled natives lose due to the possibility of cross skill
matching and the endogenous response of firms. Low-skilled immigration encourage firms
to invest more in the basic technology. Thus, the technological orientation of the economy
shifts away from more advanced, innovative products to less advanced, simpler products.
The shift in the production towards cheaper, simpler products goes along with a decrease
in welfare. Thus, the welfare of natives shrinks due to the change in the technological
orientation of the economy. Overall, it can be noted that the utility of the labor unions
decrease. However, it is worth noting that even if the utility of the labor unions decrease,
the economy-wide coverage rate of collective bargaining increase since the rate of native
low-skilled and high-skilled employment increases. The decrease in the unions’ utility is
only possible, since these are the product out of the employment rate and the individuals
workers’ rent. The reduction in the individuals workers’ rent overcompensates the increase
in the employment rates and, thereby, leads to a decline of the unions’ utility. However,
even if the utility of the labor unions decrease, they gain of importance in the economy.
6.2 Decrease in Search Costs of Immigrants
This Section quantifies the effects of a decrease in the search costs of low-skilled immi-
grants. It is assumed that they decrease by one percentage point. Table 5 illustrates the
results for the full model. The qualitative results are exactly the same as for the simplified
version of the model analyzed in Section 5.2. A decrease in the search costs of low-skilled
immigrants raises their expected utility of being unemployed. Since immigrants are better
off while being unemployed, wage pressure increases and, thereby, unemployment goes up.
Both, the decrease in the search costs and the increase in the wage rate lower the expected
profit from a filled low-tech job. Hence, firms invest ex-ante less in the basic technology,
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Table 5: The Effects of a Decrease in Search Costs of
Immigrants (Changes in Percentage Points)
Variable Change
Overall
θ -1.19
γ 0.16
φ -0.96
u 0.11
Low-skilled Natives
wNL -0.08
uNL 0.08
Low-skilled Immigrants
wIL 0.45
uIL 0.01
High-skilled Natives
wH 0.25
wOH 0.25
uH 0.02
Unions
ΩH 1.90
ΩL 1.16
Welfare
W 0.04
W1 -0.00
implying a decrease in overall labor market tightness and the fraction of low-tech vacan-
cies. As a consequence, the effective arrival rate for low-skilled natives declines. Hence,
their unemployment rate goes up, forcing the union that represents low-skilled natives to
dampen their wage claims. Considering high-skilled natives, their value of unemployment
increases due to the decline in the fraction of low-tech vacancies. Thus, it is less painful
for them to be unemployed and the union, that represents high-skilled natives, increases
their wage claims leading to higher unemployment.
Overall, it is evident that firms invest more in the advanced technology. Thus, policies
that simplify the participation of immigrants in the labor market are a suitable policy to
cushion or even reverse the unfavorable shift towards a low-tech economy. As expected,
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the shift towards the production of high-tech goods benefits the overall welfare of natives.
In contrast to the case of an influx of low-skilled immigration, where the position of unions
is strengthened in the economy, a decrease in the search costs of low-skilled immigrants
erodes the position of labor unions in the economy due the decline in the coverage rate
of collective bargaining. Even if the position of the labor unions erodes, their utility
increases since the increase in individuals workers’ rent overcompensates the decline in
coverage rates. It should further be noted that the wage inequality between low-skilled
natives and high-skilled natives rises.
7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical model to study the general equilibrium effects of low-
skilled immigration on wages, the employment structure and especially the technology
choice of firms in a unionized host country. Firms have to decide ex ante which technology
to use for production. They can either choose a basic or a more advanced technology.
Native workers are either low or high skilled, whereas immigrants are assumed to be low-
skilled. While the skill distribution of workers is exogenous, the technology choice of the
firms are determined endogenously. It is also taken into account that overqualification
exists among high-skilled natives. Thus, a high-tech firm only hires high-skilled workers,
while a low-tech firm employs either a low- or a high-skilled worker. Bargaining of native
workers, that are properly matched according to their skill level, takes place between firms,
which are represented by employer associations, and labor unions as in most European
countries wages are determined by collective bargaining.
While there already exist contributions that study one or more issues of immigration,
labor unions, overqualification and endogenous technology choices, this paper is the first
that combines all of those issues in a frictional labor market to analyze the impact of
immigration on wages, the employment structure, the position of labor unions in the
economy and especially the technology choices of firms.
The main result of the model is that firms react to an increase in low-skilled im-
28
migration and shift their production towards the basic technology and produce simple,
less-advanced goods. Thus, the composition of jobs in the economy changes and leads
to the formation of a low-tech production industry in the host country. A further, re-
markable result is that low-skilled immigration is beneficial for low-skilled natives, while
high-skilled workers are hurt in terms of wages, but gain in terms of employment. At
first sight, this may seem implausible, since low-skilled immigrants are competing with
low-skilled natives for jobs. However, firms react to the increase in low-skilled immi-
gration by producing with the less-advanced technology more intensively. Hence, the
omnipresent fear of low-skilled workers to get substituted by their immigrant counterpart
is unfounded. Next, the quantitative analysis shows that even if low-skilled immigration
leads to an increase in the coverage of collectively bargained wages for high-skilled workers
in the economy, it leads to a reduction of their wage rate and, thereby, to a decline in the
utility of the union that represents high-skilled natives. On the other hand, the utility of
the labor union that represents low-skilled natives also declines, even if low-skilled natives
gain due to immigration. The reason is that the increase in collectively bargained wages
and their employment level are overcompensated by the increase in the expected utility
of an unemployed low-skilled worker.
As a second result, it can be shown that policies that improve immigrants’ access to
the labor market, work in the opposite direction. Firms use the advanced technology
more intensively, which leads to the creation of a high-tech production industry in the
host country. From this point of view it may be a suitable economic policy to pursue a
better integration of immigrants to the labor market. On the contrary, such policies hurt
low-skilled natives both in terms of wages and employment, while high-skilled natives gain
in terms of wages, but lose in terms of employment. Thus, a disadvantage of such policies
is that the change towards high-tech production goes along with an increase in the wage
inequality among native skill groups
The focus of this paper is on the effects of low-skilled immigration on the technological
alignment of the host country. Therefore, a few simplifying assumptions are made, while
other interesting questions arising from the model are left for further research. For exam-
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ple, it would be interesting not only to allow for an endogenous skill response of firms,
but also to endogenize the educational decision of workers. The effect on the technolog-
ical alignment of the economy would crucially depend on the degree of mismatch, since
more individuals may decide to invest in a basic education if the mismatch of high-skilled
workers is quite pronounced in the economy. It would be interesting to examine how
the short-run effects (fixed education level) differ from the long-run effects (endogenous
education choice) as a lot of workers may decide to pursue the basic education due to the
unfavorable shift towards a low-tech economy and the drop in high-skilled workers’ wages
and employment that is induced by an increase in low-skilled immigration.
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A Appendix
A.1 Wage Determination
The wage rate for high-skilled workers is determined by bargaining between a labor union
and an employer association.15 Taking into account, that the thread points of both parties
are equal to zero, since the utility of both parties in case of unsuccessful negotiations equals
zero, the maximization of the generalized Nash-bargaining problem can be written as
max
wH
{
UH
}β
·
{
ΩH
}1−β
. (40)
Inserting the objective functions (15) and (17), the bargaining problem is
max
wH
{[
1−p−(1−γ)u](1−σ)[ΨEH−ΨUH ]}β ·{[1−p−(1−γ)u](1−σ)[ΠFH−ΠVH ]}1−β. (41)
Maximization of the Nash product delivers the sharing rule
β[ΠFH − ΠVH ] = (1− β)[ΨEH −ΨUH ]. (42)
Using the present value functions, eqs. (5) and (11), together with the free entry condition
ΠVH = 0, the rents of firms and workers can be substituted by
ΨEH −ΨUH =
wH − rΨUH
r + δ
and ΠFH − ΠVH =
yH − wH
r + δ
. (43)
Rearrangement leads to
wH = βyH + (1− β)rΨUH . (44)
The wage for high-skilled workers is the weighted sum of the worker’s productivity and the
value of unemployment. The weights are given by the bargaining power of the respective
participant in the negotiations. In a next step, rΨUH has to be replaced. Thus, Ψ
E
H −ΨUH
as well as ΨEOH −ΨUH have to be substituted in the present value function for unemployed
15The formal derivations of the wage rates for low-skilled natives, overqualified natives and immigrants
are similar to that of high-skilled natives. Thus, their derivations are not provided in more detail.
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high-skilled workers, eq. (14). To substitute for the rent of a high-skilled worker that is
employed in a high-tech firm, the sharing rule, eq. (42), gives
ΨEH −ΨUH = β · S, (45)
with S = (ΨEH−ΨUH)+(ΠFH−ΠVH) being the surplus of a match of the respective bargaining
parties. Using eq. (43), it turns out that
ΨEH −ΨUH = β
(yH − rΨUH
r + δ
)
. (46)
Considering the rent of a high-skilled worker that is employed in a low-tech job ΨEOH−ΨUH ,
the respective sharing rule suggests that the rent of an overqualified worker is
ΨEOH −ΨUH = β
(yL − rΨUH
r + δ
)
. (47)
Substituting eqs. (46) and (47) in eq. (14), the expected value of being unemployed for a
high-skilled worker is
rΨUH =
zH(r + δ) + θm(θ)β
[
(1− φ)yH + φyL
]
r + δ + θm(θ)β
. (48)
Finally, insertion of eq. (48) in eq. (44) and some rearrangement leads to the wage rate
given in eq. (22)
wH = zH + (yH − zH) · ΓH(θ)− (1− β)θm(θ)βφ(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
,
with ΓH(θ) = β
r+δ+θm(θ)
r+δ+θm(θ)β
.
A.2 Derivation of Equilibrium Labor Demand
Using the firm’s value functions (5) and (7) and the free-entry condition ΠVH = 0, job
creation of high-tech jobs can be stated as
cH
m(θ)(1− γ) =
yH − wH
r + δ
. (49)
Thus, it has to hold that the expected costs of creating a high-tech vacancy equals the
expected profit of a filled high-tech job, discounted by the effective discount rate r + δ.
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Substituting wH by its expression as given by eq. (22), equilibrium labor demand for
high-tech jobs is
cH(r + δ)
m(θ)
= (1− β)(1− γ)(yH − zH)(r + δ) + φθm(θ)β(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
.
Using the firm’s value functions (2) to (4), (6) and the free-entry condition ΠVL = 0,
job creation of low-tech jobs can be stated as
cL
m(θ)
= γ
[
ε
yL − wIL
r + δ
+ (1− ε)yL − wNL
r + δ
]
+ (1− γ)yL − wOH
r + δ
. (50)
Hence, the expected costs of creating a low-tech vacancy equals the expected profit of a
filled, discounted low-tech job. The expected profit of a filled low-tech job is a weighted
sum and depends on the type of worker the vacancy is filled with. The weights are
represented by the probability of meeting the respective type of worker. Inserting wIL,
wNL and wOH as given by eqs. (21), (24) and (25), equilibrium labor demand for low-tech
jobs is
cL(r + δ)
m(θ)
=
γ(r + δ)(1− β)
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
[
ε[yL − (zL − hI)] + (1− ε)(yL − zL)
]
+ (1− β) (1− γ)(r + δ)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
[
(yL − zH)− θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL)
]
.
A.3 Derivation of σ
Solving the flow for overqualified high-skilled workers that end up in low-tech jobs, eq. (31),
for σ gives
σ =
φθm(θ)(1− γ)u
δ
[
1− p− (1− γ)u] . (51)
The unemployment rate u can be replaced by using eq. (33). After some rearrangement,
it turns out that the fraction of high-skilled workers that are employed in low-tech jobs
equals the fraction of low-tech vacancies, i.e. σ = φ. The intuition for this result is as
follows: every worker, independent of the respective skill level, accepts the first low-tech
job offer. Further, a firm that uses the basic technology hires the very first applicant
that arrives. Thus, the fraction of high-skilled workers that are overqualified and work
in low-tech jobs is determined by the probability that the vacancy they are facing is a
low-tech one.
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A.4 Conditions for the Existence of CSM
A match between a firm and a worker of either skill type is formed if the respective surplus
of the match is positive. In order that each type of worker is hired, it is enough to show
that the respective profit of the firm is positive.16 Using eq. (5), the profit of a high-tech
firm that hires a high-skilled native is
ΠFH =
yH − wH
r + δ
. (52)
Insertion of eq. (22) to substitute wH and simplification gives
ΠFH =
1− β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
(yH − zH), (53)
which is positive if yH > zH . Similarly, Π
F
NL > 0 if yL > zL and Π
F
IL > 0 if yL > zL − hI .
Thus, a match between a low-tech firm and a low-skilled native will be successful, since
its profit is positive. Even if an immigrant will accept a lower wage, implying that the
firms’ profit will be higher, the firm does not to wait for an immigrant. Finally, cross-skill
matching exists if ΠFOH > 0. This is the case if
(yL − zH)(r + δ) > θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL).
This assumption guarantees that
ΠFOH =
1− β
β
[ΨEOH −ΨUH ] > 0 = ΠVL . (54)
Thus, a low-tech firm as well as a high-skilled native prefer to form a match rather than
stay vacant or unemployed, respectively.
16The sharing rule for high-skilled workers, for example, can be rewritten to obtain
ΠFH =
1− β
β
[ΨEH −ΨUH ].
Thus, a positive profit of a firm automatically implies that the workers’ rent is positive as well, since
β ∈ (0, 1).
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A.5 Comparative Statics for Changing I
As discussed in Section 5.1, it is assumed that cH = cL = c and hI = 0. This leads
the LHS of eqs. (27) and (28) to be identical. Equalizing eqs. (27) and (28) and some
rearrangement gives
γ(r + δ)
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
(yL − zL) = (1− γ)(yH − yL). (55)
To derive the changes in φ, γ, θ and u, eqs. (27), (33), (34) and (55) are used. Taking
the total derivative of eq. (34) and solving for dφ/dI gives
dφ
dI
=
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
D2 − dγdIC1 +D1
θm(θ)γ(1− p) , (56)
where C1 ≡ (1 − p)
[
φθm(θ) + δ
]
+ (p + I)
[
δ + θm(θ)
]
, D1 ≡ (1 − γ)
[
δ + θm(θ)
]
and
D2 ≡ (p + I)(1− γ)− φγ(1− p).17 Next, take the total derivative of eq. (27), rearrange
and collect terms to obtain
A1
dγ
dI
=(1− γ)θm(θ)β(yH − yL)dφ
dI
+
dθ
dI
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β)
− dθ
dI
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)β
[
c(r + δ)− (1− β)m(θ)(1− γ)φ(yH − yL)
]
m(θ)2(1− β) ,
(57)
with A1 ≡ (yH − zH)(r+ δ) + φθm(θ)β(yH − yL). The total derivative of eq. (55) is given
by
dγ
dI
[
D3+(yH−yL)
[
r+δ+φθm(θ)β
]]
= (1−γ)(yH−yL)β
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+θm(θ)
dφ
dI
]
, (58)
where D3 ≡ (r + δ)(yL − zL). Substitution of dφ/dI by eq. (56) and some rearrangement
leads to
dγ
dI
=
C3
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ C4
A2
, (59)
with C3 ≡ (yH − yL)β (1−γ)2(p+I)γ(1−p) , C4 ≡ (yH − yL)β (1−γ)
2[δ+θm(θ)]
γ(1−p) , and A2 ≡ D3 + (yH −
yL)
[
r+ δ+φθm(θ)β
]
+ (1−γ)(yH − yL)β C1γ(1−p) . Using eq. (59), dγ/dI can be substituted
in eq. (56) and, thus,
dφ
dI
=
1
θm(θ)γ(1− p)
{
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
[
D2 − C1C3
A2
]
+D1 − C1C4
A2
}
. (60)
17It will be shown later that D2 is positive.
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Finally, eqs. (59) and (60) are inserted into eq. (57) to derive a single equation that only
depends on the change in overall labor market tightness θ. After some computational
steps it turns out that
dθ
dI
= −C4(r + δ)(zH − zL)
A2B
, (61)
with
B ≡c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
C3
A2
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
A1 + (1− γ)β(yH − yL) C1
γ(1− p)
]
− ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
β
[
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) −
(1− γ)2(p+ I)(yH − yL)
γ(1− p)
]
.
It can be easily seen that the numerator in eq. (61) is positive. Thus, the change in overall
labor market tightness depends on the sign of B in the denominator, since A2 is positive
as well. It is easy to verify that the first two terms in B are negative. Hence, if the last
term in corner brackets is positive, B is clearly negative. Thus, the whole denominator of
eq. (61) would be negative implying a positive relationship between overall labor market
tightness and low-skilled immigration. The term is positive if it holds that
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) −
(1− γ)2(p+ I)(yH − yL)
γ(1− p) > 0. (62)
Replacing the first fraction by eq. (27) gives
(yH − zH)(r + δ)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
+ (yH − yL)
[
φθm(θ)β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
− (1− γ)(p+ I)
γ(1− p)
]
> 0. (63)
It is a reasonable assumption to assume that the unemployment benefits of high-skilled
workers are smaller than the value of production in a low-skilled job. This assumption
can be used to simplify eq. (63). Thus, if this condition is fulfilled for zH = yL, it has to
hold for zH < yL as well. Since yH − yL is positive, it is enough to show that
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
− (1− γ)(p+ I)
γ(1− p) > 0. (64)
Now, two cases can be distinguished in order to show that eq. (64) is positive: in the first
extreme case that φ = 1, the first fraction equals unity. Thus, it is enough to show that
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the second fraction is smaller than unity. This is the case if γ > p+I
1+I
. This condition
is fulfilled, since low-skilled workers compete with high-skilled workers for low-tech jobs.
Thus, the job finding rate of high-skilled workers is greater than the one of low-skilled
workers, since high-skilled workers can be employed in both types of jobs. In the second
extreme case, it is assumed that φ = 0. This implies that the first term reduces to
r+δ
r+δ+θm(θ)β
> 0. As there is a negative relationship between φ and γ, the latter is very
large. Thus, (1−γ)(p+I)
γ(1−p) → 0. Since eq. (64) is fulfilled for both extreme cases, it is also
valid for all possible combinations in between. Therefore, B is indeed negative and it
follows that
dθ
dI
> 0. (65)
In order to derive the change in γ, dθ/dI has to be inserted in eq. (59). Expanding
the second fraction to the same denominator and some rearrangement leads to
dγ
dI
=
C4
A2B
[
B − C3
A2
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
(r + δ)(zH − zL)
]
> 0. (66)
To examine how the fraction of low-tech vacancies changes due to an increase in
immigration, eq. (66) has to be inserted in eq. (56). Simplification yields
dφ
dI
=
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
D2 +
D1
A2
(yH − yL)[r + δ + φθm(θ)β] + D1D3B1A2B − C1C3C4A22B (r + δ)(yL − zH)
θm(θ)γ(1− p) ,
(67)
with
B1 ≡
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]
∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
C3
A2
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
A1 − ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
β
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) − C3
]
.
It is easy to verify that B1 is negative as it is just a component of B. Thus,
dφ
dI
is only
positive if D2 ≡ (1− γ)(p+ I)− φγ(1− p) is positive. Inserting the equilibrium value for
φ, it turns out that D2 ≡ δ γ(1−p)−(p+I)(1−γ)θm(θ) . It can easily be shown that D2 is positive for
γ > p+I
1+I
, which is fulfilled. This implies that
dφ
dI
> 0. (68)
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To examine the change in overall unemployment, total derivation of eq. (33) gives
du
dI
=
u
(1− γ)[δ + θm(θ)]
[[
δ + θm(θ)
]dγ
dI
− (1− γ)∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
]
. (69)
Substituting dγ
dI
and dθ
dI
by eqs. (59) and (61) yields
du
dI
= u
δ+θm(θ)
A2
C3
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ C4
A2B
[
B
[
δ + θm(θ)
]
+ (1− γ)∂θm(θ)
∂θ
(r + δ)(zH − zL)
]
(1− γ)[δ + θm(θ)] . (70)
For the whole expression to be positive, it has to be shown that the term in big corner
brackets is negative. By inserting the expression for B and some rearrangement, it turns
out that the expression is negative if
B2 + (1− γ)∂θm(θ)
∂θ
(r + δ)
[
(zH − zL)− (yH − zH)β δ + θm(θ)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]
< 0, (71)
with
B2 ≡
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]
∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
C3
A2
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
A1 + (1− γ)β(yH − yL) C1
γ(1− p)
]
− ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
β(1− γ)φθm(θ)β(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
− C3
]
.
The second term in eq. (71) is negative, if the term in corner brackets is negative. As
the difference between the output of a high-tech job and net unemployment benefits of a
high-skilled worker is much larger than simply the difference in net unemployment benefits
of high- and low-skilled individuals, this condition is fulfilled if β δ+θm(θ)
r+δ+θm(θ)β
is not very
small, which is only the case if β is close to zero. Thus, plausible parameter values for
the bargaining power of the union ensures that the condition is fulfilled. What is left is
to show that B2 is negative as well. The first term is obviously negative. After some
computational steps, it can be shown that the second and third term are negative if the
following condition holds:
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
φθm(θ)β(yH − yL)− (1− γ)(p+ I)
γ(1− p) (r + δ)(zH − zL) > 0. (72)
It has already been verified that r+δ+φθm(θ)β
r+δ+θm(θ)β
− (1−γ)(p+I)
γ(1−p) > 0. Thus, it is enough to show
that θm(θ)βφ(yH − yL) ≥ (r+ δ)(zH − zL). This inequality holds for plausible parameter
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values. Thus, the overall unemployment rate increases in immigration:
du
dI
> 0. (73)
The changes in the unemployment rates of the different types of workers can be ana-
lyzed forming the total differential of eq. (35)
duNL
dI
= − uNL
δ + φθm(θ)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dI
]
< 0 (74)
duH
dI
= − uH
δ + θm(θ)
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
< 0. (75)
It is easy to see that the unemployment rate of low- and high-skilled natives decrease due
to an increase in immigration since overall labor market tightness and the fraction of low-
tech vacancies both increase in immigration. Total differentiation of uIL does not deliver a
clear sign. However, it holds that du
dI
= duNL
dI
+ duIL
dI
+ duH
dI
. Since the overall unemployment
rate increases, and the unemployment rates of low- and high-skilled natives decrease,
the unemployment rate of low-skilled immigrants necessarily has to increase. Thus, the
increase even exaggerates the decrease in the unemployment rates of all natives.
Finally, the change in the four wage rates have to be determined. Taking the total
differential of eqs. (22) and (25), the wage rates of high-skilled workers are identical and
given by
dwH
dI
=
dwOH
dI
= β
(1− β)
[
r+δ
r+δ+θm(θ)β
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
[
yH − zH − φ(yH − yL)
]
− θm(θ)(yH − yL)dφdI
]
r + δ + θm(θ)β
.
(76)
Since the sign is not clear, the change in labor market tightness, eq. (61), and the change
in the fraction of vacancies that are opened for low-skilled workers, eq. (67), have to be
inserted. Rearrangement yields to
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dwH
dI
= β
1− β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
[
− yH − yL
γ(1− p)
D1D3
A2B
B3 − r + δ
r + δ + θm(θ)β
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
φ(yH − yL)dθ
dI
− yH − yL
γ(1− p)
(
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
D2 +
D1
A2
(yH − yL)[r + δ + φθm(θ)β]− C1C3C4
A22B
(r + δ)(yL − zH)
)
+
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
C4
A2B
(r + δ)
{
r + δ
r + δ + θm(θ)β
(yH − zH)(yL − zH)
+ (yL − zL)(yH − yL)
(
φθm(θ)β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
− (1− γ)(p+ I)
γ(1− p)
)}]
,
(77)
with
B3 ≡
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]
∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
C3A1
A2
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
< 0.
In eq. (77), all terms are negative despite the one in curly brackets. If the term in curly
brackets is positive, the whole expression gets negative, which implies that the wage of
high-skilled and overqualified workers decreases due to immigration. Considering the term
in curly brackets, it has been verified before that r+δ+φθm(θ)β
r+δ+θm(θ)β
− (1−γ)(p+I)
γ(1−p) > 0. Hence, the
term in curly brackets is positive if (yH − zH)(yL − zH) ≥ (yH − yL)(yL − zL), which can
be shown to be true for plausible parameter values and, thus,
dwH
dI
< 0 and
dwOH
dI
< 0. (78)
What is left is to analyze how the wage rates of low-skilled workers change in immi-
gration. Taking the total derivative of eqs. (21) and (24), the change in the wage rates
for low-skilled natives and immigrants can be expressed as follows:
dwNL
dI
= β
(r + δ)(1− β)[
r + δ + θm(θ)βφ
]2 (yL − zL)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dI
]
> 0 (79)
dwIL
dI
= β
(r + δ)(1− β)[
r + δ + θm(θ)βφ
]2 (yL − zIL)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dI
]
> 0. (80)
As the overall labor market tightness and the fraction of low-tech vacancies increase in
immigration, it can be directly seen that the wage rates of all low-skilled workers increase
due to an influx of low-skilled immigration.
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A.6 Comparative Statics for Changing hI
As discussed in Section 5.2, it is taken into account that cH = cL = c. This leads the LHS
of eqs. (27) and (28) to be identical. Equalizing eqs. (27) and (28) and some rearrangement
gives
γ(r + δ)
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
[
ε[yL − (zL − hI)] + (1− ε)(yL − zL)
]
= (1− γ)(yH − yL). (81)
To derive the changes in φ, γ and θ, eqs. (27), (34) and (81) are used. Total differentiation
of eq. (34) and some rearrangement gives
dφ
dhI
=
1
θm(θ)γ(1− p)
[
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
D2 − dγ
dhI
C1
]
. (82)
The total derivative of eq. (27) is similar to the previous case and given by
A1
dγ
dhI
=(1− γ)θm(θ)β(yH − yL) dφ
dhI
+
dθ
dhI
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β)
− dθ
dhI
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)β
[
c(r + δ)− (1− β)m(θ)(1− γ)φ(yH − yL)
]
m(θ)2(1− β) .
(83)
In a next step, the total differential of eq. (81) is computed, which gives
dγ
dhI
[
D4+(yH−yL)
[
r+δ+φθm(θ)β
]]
+εγ(r+δ) = (1−γ)(yH−yL)β
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
+θm(θ)
dφ
dhI
]
,
(84)
with D4 ≡ (r + δ)
[
ε[yL − (zL − hI)] + (1− ε)(yL − zL)
]
. Substituting dφ/dhI by eq. (82)
and rearrangement gives
dγ
dhI
=
C3
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
− εγ(r + δ)
A3
, (85)
with A3 ≡ D4 + (yH − yL)
[
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
]
+ (1 − γ)(yH − yL)β C1γ(1−p) . Furthermore,
replacement of dγ/dhI , eq. (85), in eq. (82) leads to
dφ
dhI
=
1
θm(θ)γ(1− p)
{
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
[
D2 − C1C3
A3
]
+
C1
A3
εγ(r + δ)
}
. (86)
Using eqs. (85) and (86) in eq. (83) it is possible to derive a single equation that only
depends on the change in overall labor market tightness:
dθ
dhI
= −εγ(r + δ)
A3B4
[
A1 + (1− γ)(yH − yL)β C1
γ(1− p)
]
> 0, (87)
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with
B4 ≡
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
C3
A3
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
A1 + (1− γ)β(yH − yL) C1
γ(1− p)
]
− ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
β
[
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) −
(1− γ)2(p+ I)(yH − yL)
γ(1− p)
]
< 0.
In order to see how the fraction of unemployed that are low skilled change in search costs
of low-skilled immigrants, eq. (87) has to be inserted in eq. (85). This gives
dγ
dhI
= − B5
A3B4
εγ(r + δ) < 0, (88)
with
B5 ≡
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
β
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) − C3
]
< 0.
As dθ
dhI
> 0 and dγ
dhI
< 0, using eq. (82) it is easy to verify that
dφ
dhI
> 0. (89)
Total differentiation of the overall unemployment rate and the unemployment rates of
each type of worker gives their changes as
du
dhI
=
u
(1− γ)[δ + θm(θ)]
[[
δ + θm(θ)
] dγ
dhI
− (1− γ)∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
]
< 0 (90)
duNL
dhI
= − uNL
δ + φθm(θ)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dhI
]
< 0 (91)
duH
dhI
= − uH
δ + θm(θ)
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
< 0 (92)
duIL
dhI
= − uIL
δ + φθm(θ)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dhI
]
< 0. (93)
Next, to analyze the change in the wage rates of high-skilled workers, the total differentials
are given by
dwH
dhI
=
dwOH
dhI
= β
(1− β)
[
r+δ
r+δ+θm(θ)β
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
[
yH − zH − φ(yH − yL)
]
− θm(θ)(yH − yL) dφdhI
]
r + δ + θm(θ)β
.
(94)
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Substitution of eq. (86) and eq. (87) leads to
dwH
dhI
= −β 1− β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
εγ(r + δ)
A3B4
[
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
D5D6
1− γ
+
yH − yL
γ(1− p)C1
(
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
βD6
)]
,
(95)
with D5 ≡ A1 + (1 − γ)β(yH − yL) C1γ(1−p) and D6 ≡ c(r+δ)m(θ)(1−β) − (1−γ)
2(p+I)(yH−yL)
γ(1−p) . Thus,
the wage rates for high-skilled workers decrease as long as the term in big corner brackets
is negative. This condition holds, so that
dwH
dhI
< 0 and
dwOH
dhI
< 0. (96)
Finally, the change in the wage rate for low-skilled natives is given by
dwNL
dhI
= β
(r + δ)(1− β)[
r + δ + θm(θ)βφ
]2 (yL − zL)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dI
]
> 0. (97)
As the overall labor market tightness and the fraction of low-tech vacancies increase in
immigration, it can be directly seen that the wage rate of all low-skilled natives increase
due to an influx of low-skilled immigration.
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PERU 
 
IK 
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO 
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
 
ECO 
33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
Ulrich Schwalbe 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
IK 
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39-2011 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and  
Oliver Frör 
 
 
RESPONDENT INCENTIVES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: THE 
ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
 
    ECO 
40-2011 Tobias Börger  
 
A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
 
    ECO 
41-2011 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
 
QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
    IK 
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42-2012 Benjamin Schön,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny, 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ,  
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 
       IK 
49-2012 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 
       IK 
 
52-2012 
 
Fabian Wahl 
 
WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
        
ECO 
 
53-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Micha Kaiser 
 
STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 
        
IK 
 
54-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan and Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
 
55-2012 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
 
        
ECO 
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56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO        
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62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
 
69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
Ulloa, Valerie Møller 
and Alfonso Sousa-
Poza   
 
HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
HCM 
 
 
73-2013 
 
Wencke Gwozdz, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 
Gabriele Eiben, Juan 
M. Fernández-Alvira, 
Charalampos 
Hadjigeorgiou, Eva 
Kovács, Fabio Lauria, 
Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
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74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
VERSICHERBARKEIT 
 
HCM 
 
 
75-2013 
 
Yin Krogmann, 
Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
CENTRALITY-BASED PARTNERING CAPABILITY? 
 
ECO, IK 
 
 
76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
 
ECO 
 
 
77-2013 
 
Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
 
 
78-2013 
 
Benjamin Schön, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
 
IK 
 
 
79-2013 
 
Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 
IK 
 
 
80-2013 
 
Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
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86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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